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Abstract 
 
For many globally dispersed organizations the home base (HB) is historically the locus 
of integrative, coordinating and innovating efforts, important for the overall 
performance. The growing concerns about the offshoring strategies posing threats to the 
capabilities of the HB draw attention to how a HB can continuously sustain its 
centrality. The well-known challenges of distance in the distributed working 
arrangements may be regarded as a major threat to the network management capabilities 
(NMCs) of the HB. Therefore, this paper investigates what role does distance between 
the HB and its subsidiaries play as the HB develops its NMCs. 
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Introduction 
Challenges and opportunities of globalization tempt firms to reconfigure their 
operations and relocate discrete value-added activities to the most advantageous 
destinations (Jahns et al., 2006; Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009). This process may occur 
on an “intrafirm” basis (captive offshoring) or may involve the vertical disintegration of 
activities (offshore outsourcing to external suppliers). As a result the increased 
dispersion and specialization of firms occurs that requires a shift to collective 
organization form - the network (Ernst and Kim, 2002). Greater specialization promotes 
growing autonomy and capability of the sites, which is an important development driver 
in the network. However, it also makes it more difficult to achieve coordinated action, 
and some control is needed from a central entity that can perform the integrating 
function, as well as diffuse innovations and knowledge in the network (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1999; Mugurusi and de Boer, 2013). For many companies the home base (HB) 
is historically the locus of such managerial centrality. It takes the lead in regard to 
setting and maintaining standards, as it embeds historical knowledge and capabilities.  
In this light, concerns that the offshoring strategies endanger the HB capabilities 
deserve attention. Extant literature shows that these effects only become evident over a 
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longer time span and are, therefore, often not fully recognized. They describe a situation 
where the HB gradually loses the ability to evaluate suppliers’ performance, innovate 
and coordinate in the network of its globally dispersed operations, etc. (Vining, 1999; 
Kotabe et al., 2008). Some authors argue that the HB loses its network management 
capabilities (NMCs) and the ability to bring value to the network due to its lack of 
insight into the increasingly dispersed and complex operations (Ciabuschi et al. 2012).  
With regard to the latter view, the well-known challenges of distance to the 
knowledge transfer and communication may be suggested among the major threats to 
the HB NMCs. The extant literature, however, takes a static perspective on the role of 
distance, while offshoring is a constantly evolving process, where capabilities of the HB 
may change accordingly, and therefore, influence of distance may change as well. Thus, 
in order to understand the impact of distance between the HB and its offshore 
subsidiaries on the HB NMCs (and consequently on its ability to bring value in the 
network), it should be studied within the context of the company’s offshoring process.   
 
Theoretical background 
Network management capabilities (NMC) of the HB 
Recognizing the NMCs’ importance, researchers disagree about its content. Some 
describe it as the traditional coordinating and controlling, others refer to more indirect 
forms of influence (Knight and Harland, 2005). Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) discuss 
network orchestration in general terms and refer to it as the ability of a lead organization 
to create value in the network. Focusing on the latter, we can refer to Forsgren and 
Holm’s (2010) discussion of the value-bringing potential of the HQ of a multinational 
enterprise. The authors refer to “entrepreneurial functions” of the HQ, with which it can 
contribute to the sub-unit value-creating activities: policy, monitoring and cognitive 
functions. Further we will refer to these functions as the HB’s NMCs. Policy function 
includes decisions on what value-creating projects should be carried out, and the 
allocation of resources to these projects. The monitoring function deals with the control 
of value-creating activities, including evaluating their performance. The cognitive 
function deals with the extent to which HQ contributes knowledge to value-creating 
activities at the subsidiary level through actual involvement in the processes and 
through transfer of expertise. Value creating activity is a process, by which a subsidiary 
masters and implements product designs and manufacturing processes that are new to it.  
The effectiveness of these NMCs depends on how one views the HB’s knowledge 
situation. For example, Forsgren and Holm (2010) describe two opposite perspectives 
on the latter. The “Rational perspective”, rooted in transaction cost economics, 
advocates that, though the HQs lacks specific knowledge about the subsidiaries, it has a 
fair understanding of what kind of knowledge it requires. Based on this the HQs designs 
efficient structures, decision rules, and control systems, including its own role in value-
creating processes at the subsidiary level. Another perspective - the “Radical uncertainty 
view” - is based on the belief that firms are distributed knowledge systems, where 
knowledge is socially embedded and cannot be controlled in its entirety by any single 
actor (Foss, 2002). Accordingly, the HQs not only lacks the knowledge, but also often 
does not acknowledge the lack, having a potential to destroy value. The HQs can only 
acquire such knowledge through direct involvement into the subsidiary’s activities. 
 
NMCs of the HB and distance  
Distance is a well-acknowledged impediment to the distributed work (Abbott, 2007; 
Dankbaar, 2007), and particularly to knowledge transfer (Ambos and Ambos, 2009; 
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Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Based on the earlier described importance of knowledge 
about the subsidiaries as a determinant of the HB’s NMCs, it can be suggested that 
distance between the HB and its subsidiaries may contribute to the challenging 
knowledge situation of the HB, and consequently hamper its managerial functions. 
Doz and Santos (1997) distinguish between several distance dimensions, as their 
various combinations may challenge the distributed work differently. They explicate 
them through contrast with the conditions of collocation and co-setting, where distance 
is determined by lack of co-location and lack of shared context. Collocation implies 
same time zones and shared space. Shared context may include a common language, 
shared national and organizational cultures, technology, administrative systems.  
  
Offshoring process, distance and NMCs of the HB 
In the literature distance is mainly discussed as a stable phenomenon. However, 
offshoring is a constantly evolving process, where capabilities of the HB change, which 
allows expecting that the impact of distance may vary in this process. Research taking a 
longer-term perspective on the challenges of distance advocates that the latter decrease, 
as the co-working parties adjust to each other (Håkanson, 2014). Others argue that, if to 
consider tendencies in the offshoring process of many companies, cultural and language 
differences between the parent and the offshore unit are challenging at the beginning of 
this process, while later the time zones cause most of the managerial challenges 
(Mugurusi and de Boer, 2013). Taking such views into account, we believe that, in 
order to understand the impact of distance on HB NMCs (and, therefore, on its ability to 
create value in the network), it should be studied within the context of the offshoring 
process. Thus, the research objective of this paper is to address what role various 
contextual differences play as the HB develops its NMCs. To capture the latter within 
the offshoring process we approach it as a temporal sequence of events that create and 
alter the global network configuration over time (Srai and Gregory, 2008).  
 
Methodology 
An in-depth retrospective case study strategy was chosen because it allows studying the 
longitudinal change process and focusing on the dynamics present within single settings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The case studies are often criticized for providing little basis for 
scientific generalization, as they are situation specific. Others consider this to be 
strength because, as the findings are unstable over time, the context gains particular 
importance, making a case study particularly beneficial (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
The main selection criteria were company’s long offshoring history and active 
altering of global operations. The case company originated in 1976 in Denmark and 
became one of the leading industrial goods companies. It has production facilities in 
Denmark, the United States (US), Slovakia and China; it employs 1,600 people 
worldwide; 80% of its products are customized solutions. The study focuses on the 
offshoring histories of two products, which have been produced by the company in the 
different global network settings during 1999 and 2014.   
The data were collected through semi-structured interviews, archival documents and 
on-site observations to enable the triangulation of the findings. In total, 28 interviews 
lasting 1.5 hours each were conducted with managerial and operational staff at the 
Danish HB and affiliates in China and Slovakia. To capture the offshoring process in 
retrospect, an event-sampling approach was used. Subsequent data analysis was focused 
on the HB managerial functions as described in the Theoretical Background and the role 
of various contextual differences in their development and effectiveness. Initially, the 
product “stories” were written up based on the interviews at the HB and were then 
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presented to the key informants to verify the accuracy. Investigation at the subsidiaries 
allowed enriching it, and was followed by a workshop with the management. 
 
Case descriptions 
 
Product A. From knowledge transfer to joint solution development and coordination  
Starting from 1999 a part of Product A capacity was relocated from the Danish factory 
to the US, China and Slovakia, driven by customer requests for better prices, larger 
volumes and faster delivery. Here the main HB task was to enable the sites’ production 
according to specifications. First product introductions were described as periods of 
“active experimentation”, based on which a set of practices and a checklist of what is 
ought to be carried out were turned into a corporate procedure. An important part of 
such implementations was replication of the production setup and practices from the HB 
to the sites. One of the biggest distance-related impediments mentioned in this process 
was the language barrier. Translation of documents, face-to-face training programs for 
the personnel and temporary placement of the domestic staff at offshore sites helped to 
overcome this problem. Moreover, the HB was continuously supporting the sites, 
referring to the HB production as a benchmark and the platform for problem resolution. 
Language barrier and lack of shared organizational culture were challenging here as 
well (Table 1a), but were offset by presence of Danish expatriates at the sites. 
Later on, the appearance of global customer and the lack of the HB production 
capacity led to “joint” projects, requiring the HB to team up with subsidiaries. This 
brought to the surface differences in production contexts among the HB and the sites, 
which were previously non-apparent (for example, differences in the part numbering 
approaches, details of production and testing processes). From this point the HB was 
responsible for “aligning” these deficiencies and coordinating among the sites. 
Moreover, due to the increase in sites’ product modification capabilities and localization 
of supplier bases, consultation requests towards the HB became more complex. The HB 
became less capable of suggesting quick solutions. Therefore, due to the increase in the 
differences in production contexts between the sites and the HB, it had to start devising 
solutions in cooperation with the sites. Thus, in the presence of interdependencies, the 
differences in production contexts made the HB take on largely coordinating roles, 
using its own production as a benchmark. The same change applied to the introduction 
of improvements to the product on sites. Time zone (Table 1b) and cultural differences 
(Table 1c-e) were the main challenges to these coordination and monitoring efforts. 
Having gained experience with managerial activities, as well as facing an overload 
with its tasks, the HB staff created a variety of corporate procedures to replace them. To 
do this they relied on their knowledge of problematic issues and on the subsidiaries’ 
assistance. Also some production processes were efforts were standardized. To tackle 
differences in cultural contexts the HB, introduced a practice of documenting the 
communication results, provided trainings on cultural differences and facilitated 
meetings of staffs from different sites. To encourage knowledge sharing and relief the 
HB staff of related burden official regular global meetings were established and global 
communication rules introduced. All this was supported by the introduction of advanced 
electronic communication systems and the partial automation of procedures.   
 
Product B. From joint solution development and coordination to information transfer 
facilitation and advising 
The offshoring history of Product B started similarly to Product A: with the HB 
introducing the product to the three subsidiaries and further coordinating and aligning 
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operations. However, after some time the Product B production was closed at the HB, 
transferring both production and product responsibility to the Slovakian subsidiary, 
while the HB resigned to the role of advising on “high level” product-related decisions. 
However, the sites continued addressing the HB for advice due to the lack of 
experience and some tacit organizational knowledge. So the HB had to again 
occasionally take on its previous roles of technical support and developing solutions 
together with the sites. However, as time passed and the product evolved at the sites, the 
HB staff started increasingly finding themselves with residual product-specific 
knowledge, which becomes less and less sufficient to provide suitable advice (Table 1f). 
Thus, it may be concluded that growth in difference in the production context (due to 
elimination of the shared product from the HB) left the HB with a role of knowledge 
sharing facilitator, rather than transferring knowledge or developing it together with the 
sites, like it used to be before. Differences in the production context paired with 
differences in cultural context impacted the monitoring and control abilities of the HB 
as well. On one hand, having little product specifics in common, sites tended not to 
speak up, until getting into considerable difficulties. A more hierarchical mindset at the 
sites (comparing to Denmark) worsened this tendency. Many issues were detected and 
resolved late. On the other hand, differences in the production and cultural contexts 
tended to distort the perception of the HB staff about performance of the sites (Table 
1g). Also some performance implications were attributed to the deviations from 
corporate standards, introduced earlier by the HB, which were partially attributed to the 
differences in cultural context as well (Table 1h). Such tendencies currently pose 
concerns to the HB management about the sustainability of the established alignment in 
the global organization, as well as product performance according to the high company 
standards. Currently they are trying to devise new measures of monitoring and follow-
up in the operations. Moreover, given the increased gap in the production context, the 
HB started experiencing difficulties with introduction of product improvements. For 
example, having gained certain experience with the product the site’s staff started to 
come up with product improvement suggestions (before they were coming only from 
and through the HB). However, it proved to be extremely difficult to get the HB 
consideration and approval, as drawing on its previous experience with the product, the 
HB did not take the site’s initiatives seriously (Table 1i).  
 
Table 1 - Quotes supporting the case descriptions 
a) “When Denmark is asking X something and I see that what he is replying is not what they 
are asking about. I can understand it right away because I have an experience from 
Denmark. And then I can call him and ask to stop replying.” 
b) “Decision-making takes more time, as we have to check more “corners” with all the sites. 
And this person in charge is challenged by time zones, as he can’t just grab the phone and 
run to another part of the building.” 
c) “We have to put more effort into this when making changes, do follow-ups – always asking 
them: have you changed? Instead of a normal Danish way: if I give you information and an 
assignment – you do it. But that’s not the way it is in the US.” 
d) “China is a challenge, because if they can cheat you – they will. So we have to control and 
follow them up tight. Communication with Chinese is very difficult – they never say if 
something is wrong, or if they don’t understand.” 
e) “The management on site [Slovakia] used to be Danish and it was much easier to make 
them fix mistakes. Now cultural differences are introduced on the management level. They 
are not just a phone-call away anymore, and they will start arguing out of independency.” 
f) “It is much easier to handle all this while we have the product on-site. I can refer any 
problems on sites directly to our local production. But on [product B] when they address me I 
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need to contact all other sites and push them to talk to each other. I am outside, but have to 
act like the center. I am facilitating the dialogue but I don’t have competence anymore. 
Currently I am at least able to find those people who were related to this product.” 
g) “Denmark was supposed to test the products, and do the milestone audits. And this 
communication was not easy. Because in China everything is done faster (they invite people 
to the party a week before, while in Denmark – a month). So Denmark was very slow in 
responses. And people were just pointing at China, that we don’t know how to do it.” 
h) “They allowed the supplier replace this component without permission. It is important in 
Chinese culture to be nice to their partners. And then other sites got “polluted” parts.” 
i) “That situation with spindles was very demotivating. We’ve been talking about the problem 
for a long time and no one believed us. Only after 5 weeks they agreed. From this we had an 
impression that engineers in Denmark are not looking at Slovakian engineers as partners.” 
 
Discussion 
Described product histories can be approximated as a general company’s history and 
development trajectory, as the Product A is likely to follow the Product’s B history due 
to the growing scarcity of resources at the HB. Also the product responsibility 
delegation to the sites (like with product B) is an ongoing trend. 
Dimensions of contextual differences emphasized by the interviewees along the 
offshoring process indicate that distance between the HB and the sites gradually 
increased, as the number of dimensions of contextual differences accumulated. As Doz 
and Santos (1997) put it, the fewer elements of context is there in common between two 
cooperating parties – the weaker is the form of co-setting and thus larger the distance is. 
At the beginning cultural, organizational, language differences were actually stimulating 
the HB to develop different approaches to cope with them. However, further addition of 
differences in production context (first process-wise and then product-wise) had a 
different implication. They impacted the frequency and nature of the HB-subsidiaries 
interaction: it changed from being based on details of the sites operations to general 
information and status updates. As a result, the HB started experiencing difficulties with 
monitoring, cognitive and policy functions, as will be discussed further.  
 
Changeable knowledge situation of the HB   
Later history of the product B illustrates the change in its knowledge situation from not 
possessing specific knowledge about the subsidiaries, but understanding what 
knowledge it requires - to not only lacking knowledge, but also not acknowledging the 
lack. The latter situation corresponds to the “Radical uncertainty” view (as described in 
the theoretical background). At the same time, the later history of Product A showed the 
ability of the HB to evaluate, what information about the subsidiaries it lacks, and 
design efficient structures, decision rules and control systems. Such ability of the HB to 
bring value without the direct involvement into operations is advocated by the Rational 
perspective. Such contrasting observations indicate that the ability of the HB to bring 
value to the network can be explained by both of these contrasting theoretical 
perspectives – but in the different stages of the company’s history. To track this in detail 
we can look individually at policy, monitoring and cognitive functions of the HB in its 
offshoring history, using a framework by Forsgren and Holm (2010), characterizing 
these functions, depending on which of the two perspectives one choses (Figure 1). 
At the start of the offshoring process the policy function (for example, introduction of 
new product or product improvements) was action oriented, “learning by doing” 
process, based on existing resources, rather than goal-oriented process - in accordance 
with Radical uncertainty perspective. Minor contextual differences stimulated the HB to 
interact more with the sites to overcome these differences. Thus, the HB was bringing 
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value through involvement into the value creating activities of the sites. However, as the 
HB gained experience in such implementations it was able to “standardize” the process, 
so that policy function became largely goal oriented and bringing value in accordance 
with Rational perspective. At the same time, later in the process, when contextual 
differences became larger and the value-creating initiatives (e.g. product improvement 
suggestions) started coming from the sites and not the HB – they met resistance of the 
HB, who acted based on role expectations, despite its lack of knowledge and based on 
its past experience – therefore bringing little value in accordance with the prediction of 
Radical uncertainty perspective. In the provided example of product B the subsidiary 
actually made the HB approve a change through finally involving it directly into the 
context of their production process (they made HB people visit their shop floor). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Characteristics of the policy, monitoring and cognitive functions of the HB, 
depending on the perspective adopted (Rational vs Radical uncertainty) (Adopted from 
Forsgren and Holm (2010)). 
 
In the alike manner monitoring function at the beginning was enabled by the HB own 
participation in the value creating activities of the subsidiaries. However, further some 
parts of this monitoring were substituted by procedures and formalized processes, which 
corresponds to value creation according to Rational perspective. However, in the case of 
product B not all of the monitoring needs were recognized, when the HB was actively 
involved in the sites’ operations, and became apparent only later, when interactions 
seized and there were no means to establish required monitoring measures. This created 
monitoring challenges later. Currently the company is in search for appropriate 
measures, while temporary this function is performed by a designated manager, who 
performs frequent trips to the site to stay familiar with its production context. 
Cognitive function was performed by the HB effectively from the start in accordance 
with Rational perspective, enabled by a much higher HB expertise, comparing to the 
sites. However, with the increase of contextual differences and worsening of the 
knowledge situation of the HB it indeed started acting largely out of the “role 
expectations”, despite not having expertise at hand – in accordance with the Radical 
uncertainty prediction. However, these contributions were also valuable, because the 
HB was not advising something just for the sake of it, but tried to facilitate involvement 
of the people with relevant knowledge. Thus, cognitive function within the lack of 
shared context transformed into mobilization of network participants with appropriate 
expertise, and further bringing them into the same context with the subsidiary. 
 
Sequential nature of value-creation/destruction by the HB 
In the previous discussion we can see a certain sequence in the way HB brings (or 
destroys) value to the subsidiaries. Involvement into their activities in the shared context 
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allowed the HB to perform policy, monitoring and cognitive functions in accordance 
with Radical uncertainty perspective - bringing value through the direct involvement 
(Figure 2a). Accumulation of knowledge about the sites’ operations and context in this 
process allowed the HB to further bring value with these functions, but based on 
Rational perspective: replacing its direct involvement into operations with rules and 
procedures (Figure 2b). However, reduction of the HB direct involvement, no shared 
context to stimulate it, and natural evolution in the subsidiaries’ operations gradually 
made the existing knowledge of the HB obsolete. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
functions, based on this knowledge, was challenged. Therefore, the HB knowledge 
situation got back in accordance with Radical uncertainty perspective (Figure 2c). This 
explains the challenges, which the HB faced when performing its functions at the end of 
the offshoring process.  In such cases the HB had to “get back” into the same context, 
get in touch with the actual experiences at the subsidiaries in order to bring value again 
(Figure 2d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Sequence of value-bringing/destruction by the HB 
 
As the case showed, lack of HB knowledgeability about the network manifests itself 
over time, as the contexts of the HB and the sites grow apart (due to the network 
evolution), discouraging the detail-based interaction between the two. Ability of the 
company to avoid getting into the value-destruction stage (Figure 2c) is important here. 
Therefore, it is important for the HB to recognize the tendencies of its existing 
knowledge becoming obsolete, pointing to the need to update it through returning to the 
same context with the subsidiary. In fact, this process of experiential learning and 
development of policy, monitoring and cognitive abilities may be regarded as a result of 
application of the dynamic capability of learning, where the outcome of such learning is 
actually development of certain managerial capability (e.g. monitoring) (Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2009). Then for the HB it becomes very important to recognize, when the 
developed capabilities become ineffective, and the dynamic capability of learning needs 
to be re-applied. Such observations support the proponents of the “dual” view on 
dynamic capabilities (Schreyögg and Kliesch‐Eberl, 2007), who argue that timely usage 
of dynamic capabilities is more important than their quality. Therefore, we believe that 
further research should be directed at studying “weak signals” of capability destruction 
(or knowledge obsolesce) in order to inform the practitioners when it is time to update 
knowledge about their network (Figure 2d). 
 
Maintaining the HB ability to create value in the network – a framework  
A need for the HB to stay knowledgeable about its subsidiaries’ operations and their 
local networks is widely advocated by the researchers, concerned with the challenging 
knowledge situation of HQs in MNCs – the so called “liability of outsidership” (Vahlne 
et al. 2012). They recommend the HQs to continuously interact with key people at the 
Degree of shared context needed to stimulate interaction of the HB with the sites  
High Low 
(a) HB brings value through 
direct involvement with the 
subsidiaries 
(Radical uncertainty 
perspective) 
(b) HB brings value through 
established rules and procedures 
(based on the detailed knowledge 
acquired on the previous stage) 
(Rational perspective) 
(c) HB destroys value due to 
outdated knowledge and lack of 
involvement with the sites 
(Radical uncertainty 
perspective) 
(d) 
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subsidiaries, compensating them for the resources spent on such cooperation. However, 
continuous interaction with the subsidiaries can be a burden for the HB, located in an 
expensive country, where slack resources are a luxury. However, as the case company’s 
experience showed, there is a possibility of organizing this learning process and the 
basis for value bringing by the HB in a sequential way, which does not require 
continuous involvement of the HB into the subsidiaries operations (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Framework of sequential value-creation by the HB 
 
Participation of the HB in the value creating activities of the subsidiary is an important 
prerequisite of developing sufficient knowledge (Stage 1) to further perform the same 
functions without involvement into the operations (Stage 2). Involvement of the HB in 
the context of the subsidiary on Stage 1 is important to facilitate interaction. At the 
same time, due to the tendency of subsidiary and HB contexts to grow apart, previously 
established measures may become obsolete. Therefore, there is a need to monitor when 
this happens (Stage 3), and bring the HB back in touch with the subsidiaries’ context 
again (Stage 1). We expect that content of the activities on each stage will vary 
according to different HB functions (policy, monitoring, cognitive). However, precise 
definitions lie outside the scope of this paper and open avenues for the further research.  
 
Conclusion 
This work aimed to investigate the role of distance (as various contextual differences) in 
the HB ability to perform managerial functions (policy, monitoring and cognitive) in its 
global network over time. The findings showed that in the offshoring process the 
contextual differences between the HB and the sites gradually increased (new 
dimensions of contextual differences got added up). And, while at the beginning 
cultural, organizational and language differences were stimulating the HB to develop 
different approaches to cope with them, differences in production context (first process-
wise and then product-wise) impacted the frequency and nature of interactions between 
the HB and the sites, which reduced the knowledgeability of the HB regarding the sites’ 
operations, challenging its ability to perform its functions effectively. Based on the case 
company experience, the present work suggested a staged framework of how the HB 
can ensure to continuously stay knowledgeable and bring value to its network.  
The paper contributes to the discussion of the conditions of value creation by the HQ 
in a multinational enterprise, and offers an attempt of resolution of an argument between 
two contradicting perspectives on knowledge situation of HQ. It also suggests avenues 
for future research. The main limitations of the study include the use of only one 
company, rendering highly suggestive results. 
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High  
Low 
Stage 1 
Acquisition of knowledge about subsidiaries’ operations and networks 
through involvement into subsidiaries’ activities in a shared context 
Stage 2  
Design of efficient structures, 
decision rules, and control 
systems 
Stage 3 
Monitoring of effectiveness of established 
measures (monitoring of “weak signals” of 
capability destruction/knowledge obsolesce) 
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